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Abstract 
We have introduced in former work [5] the concept of Deep 
Randomness and its interest to design Unconditionally Secure 
communication protocols. We have in particular given an example of 
such protocol and introduced how to design a Deep Random 
Generator associated to that protocol. Deep Randomness is a form of 
randomness in which, at each draw of random variable, not only the 
result is unpredictable bu also the distribution is unknown to any 
observer. In this article, we remind formal definition of Deep 
Randomness, and we expose two practical algorithmic methods to 
implement a Deep Random Generator within a classical computing 
resource. We also discuss their performances and their parameters. 
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I. Introduction 
Prior probabilities theory 
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory. 
The art of prior probabilities consists in assigning probabilities to a random event in a context of 
partial or complete uncertainty regarding the probability distribution governing that random event. The 
first author who has rigorously considered this question is Laplace [10], proposing the famous 
principle of insufficient reason by which, if an observer does not know the prior probability of 
occurrence of 2 events, he should consider them as equally likely. In other words, if a random variable 
  can take several values        , and if no information regarding the prior probabilities         
is available for the observer, he should assign them           ⁄  in any attempt to produce 
inference from an experiment of  . 
Several authors observed that this principle can lead to conclusion contradicting the common sense in 
certain cases where some knowledge is available to the observer but not reflected in the assignment 
principle. 
If we denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability 
distribution of a certain random variable (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of 
that variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  , it is then 
  
possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information      
   regarding an experiment of  ; we denote this set of possible distributions as: 
   
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning 
in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider 
groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable  , that do not change 
the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation   of such group, the 
observer has no information enabling him to privilege            |   rather than         
        |   as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7], in 
order to avoid the incoherence brought in some cases by the imprudent application of Laplace 
principle. 
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and 
bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups   as the ones fulfilling 
the 2 conditions below: 
     Stability - For any distribution      , and for any transformation    , then         
     Convexity - Any distribution that is invariant by action of   does belong to    
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of   is exactly: 
      {
 
| |
∑    
   
|      } 
The condition      is justified by the fact that in the absence of information enabling the observer to 
privilege    from     , he should choose equivalently one or the other distribution, but then of 
course the average distribution 
 
| |
∑         should still belong to the set    of possible distributions 
knowing  . 
The set of acceptable groups as defined above is denoted: 
   
Let’s consider some examples. 
Example 1: we consider a 6-sides dice. We are informed that the distribution governing the 
probability to draw a given side is altered, but we have no information of what that distribution 
actually is, and we have no available information regarding an experiment. We want nevertheless to 
assign an a priori probability distribution for the draw of dice. In this very simple case, it seems quite 
reasonable to assign an a priori probability of   ⁄  to each side. A more rigorous argument to justify 
this decision, based on the above, is the following: let’s consider   the finite group of transformation 
that let the dice unchanged, this group   is well known, it is generated by the 3 axis 90° rotations, and 
has 24 elements. It is clear here that     . It is also clear that, by considering a given distribution 
         , the a priori information available to the observer gives him no ground to privilege 
          rather than (             ) for any    , and therefore the distribution should be of the 
form: 
  
{(
 
| |
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)
  {    }
}
{       }
 
It is easy to calculate that whatever is          , 
 
| |
∑      
   
 
 
 
∑  
 
   
 
 
 
 
and therefore in this trivial example, the Laplace principle applies nicely. 
Example 2: let’s now suppose that we have the result   of a draw of the dice. Then the symmetry 
disappears and the opponent may want to assign, as an extreme example, a probability 
         {
              
           
 
which does not follow Laplace principle although one could argue that the knowledge of one single 
draw is not incompatible with the distribution {     ⁄ }. We however clearly don’t want to exclude 
that extreme choice from the set of theoretically valid assignment made by the observer. An applicable 
group is in this case the sub-group   of   that let the side   invariant. It is easy to see that it is 
composed with the 4 rotations                    whose axis is determined by the centers of the 
sides   and    . 
{(
 
| |
∑      
   
)
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}
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} 
One could argue that in a given probabilistic situation, there may exist several groups of 
transformation in   , and in that case, the choice of a given such group may appear arbitrary to assign 
the probability distribution. Although that oddness is not a problem for our purpose, we can solve it 
when 2 reasonable conditions are fulfilled: (i) we only consider finite sample space (note that objects 
in digital communication theory are bounded and discrete), and (ii) we assume that    is convex 
(which can be ensured by design of the Deep Random source). Under those 2 conditions, all groups of 
transformation applying on the sample space are sub-groups of the finite (large) group of permutations 
  applying on all the possible states, and if 2 groups of transformations   and    applying on the 
sample space are in   , it is easy to see that      is still a finite sub-group of  , it contains   and    
and it is still in   . Consequently, for any observer having the same knowledge   of the distribution, 
there exists a unique maximal sub-group      , and this one should be ideally applied to obtain a 
maximal restriction of the set of distribution (because it is easy to check that if     , then       
      ). We can remark also that, if the uniform distribution is in   , then ⋂             because 
      then always contains the uniform distribution. 
However, it is not necessary for our purpose to be able to determine such unique maximal sub-group 
   if it exists. 
  
Another objection could be that the definition of    may appear too ‘black or white’ (a distribution 
belongs or does not belong to   ), although real situations may not be so contrasted. This objection is 
not applicable to our purpose because in the case of Deep Random Generation, that we will introduce 
in section IV, we can ensure by design that distributions do belong to a specific set   . But otherwise, 
generally speaking, it is somehow preferable to draft the condition      as: 
     For any distribution  , and for any transformation   in such group, the observer has no 
information enabling him to privilege   rather than    as the actual distribution. 
Deep Random assumption 
We can now introduce and rigorously define the Deep Random assumption. The Deep Random 
assumption imposes a rule enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning about an observer   in a 
context where that observer   only has partial knowledge of a probability distribution. 
Let   be a private random variable with values in a metric set  . Keeping the notations of the previous 
section, we still denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the 
probability distribution of    (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of that 
variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  . Typically,   
represents a secret information that   has to determine with the highest possible accuracy, and 
        represents the public information available to   (like for instance the information about 
the design of the Deep Random source, plus the information exchanged during a communication 
protocol as introduced in the following sections). 
For any group   of transformations applying on the sample space  , we denote by       the set of all 
possible conditional expectations when the distribution of   courses      . In other words: 
      {      [ | ]|         } 
Or also: 
      {     ∫        
 
 
|         } 
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if     , the strategy    of the opponent observer  , 
in order to estimate   from the public information  , should be chosen by the opponent observer   
within the restricted set of strategies: 
                                                                                  
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of   to choose his 
strategy in order estimate the private information   from his knowledge of the public information  . It 
is a fully reasonable assumption as exposed in the previous section presenting Prior probability theory, 
because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action of a transformation that let the 
distribution uncertainty unchanged. 
    suggests of course that    should eventually be picked in ⋂           (that equals to        
when    exists), but it is enough for our purpose to find at least one group of transformation with 
which one can apply efficiently the Deep Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an 
advantage distilled by the legitimate partners compared to the opponent. 
  
 
Application of Deep Random generators to Secrecy Systems 
Shannon, in [1], established his famous impossibility result. Shannon defines perfect secrecy of a 
secrecy system, as its ability to equal the probability of the clear message      and the conditional 
probability    |   of the clear message knowing the encrypted message. In the case where the 
encryption system is using a shared secret key   with a public transformation procedure to transform 
the clear message into the encrypted message, Shannon establishes that perfect secrecy can only be 
obtained if         . 
It is a common belief in the cryptologic community that, in cases where the legitimate partners 
initially share no secret information (which we can write       ), the result of Shannon thus means 
that it is impossible for them to exchange a perfectly secret (or almost perfectly secret) bit of 
information. The support for that belief is that, in the absence of key entropy, the conditional 
expectation  [ | ], that is the best possible estimation of   knowing  , is completely and equally 
known by all the parties (legitimate receiver and observer), as : 
 [ | ]  ∑ 
   |      
∑    |          
 
 
and thus, that the legitimate receiver cannot gain any advantage over the observer when he tries to 
estimate the secret clear message from the public encrypted message. This reasoning however 
supposes that all the parties have a full knowledge of the distribution     , enabling them to perform 
the above Bayesian inference to estimate  from  . 
Shannon himself warned the reader of [1] to that regard, but considered that this assumption is fairly 
reasonable (let’s remember that computers were almost not yet existing when he wrote his article): 
« There are a number of difficult epistemological questions connected with the theory of secrecy, or in fact with 
any theory which involves questions of probability (particularly a priori probabilities, Bayes’ theorem, etc.) 
when applied to a physical situation. Treated abstractly, probability theory can be put on a rigorous logical 
basis with the modern measure theory approach. As applied to a physical situation, however, especially when 
“subjective” probabilities and unrepeatable experiments are concerned, there are many questions of logical 
validity. For example, in the approach to secrecy made here, a priori probabilities of various keys and 
messages are assumed known by the enemy cryptographer. » 
The model of security that we have developed in [5], by enabling the legitimate partners to use a 
specific form of randomness where the a priori probabilities of the messages cannot be efficiently 
known by the observer, puts this observer in a situation where the above reasoning based on Bayesian 
inference no longer stands. We considered in [5] secrecy protocols where all the information 
exchanged by the legitimate partners   and   over the main channel are fully available to the passive 
observer  .   has unlimited computation and storage power.   and   share initially no private 
information. 
 Beyond being capable to Generate random bit strings, Publish bit strings on the main channel, Read 
published bit strings from the main channel, Store bit strings, and Make computation on bit strings, the 
legitimate partners   and   are also capable to generate bit strings with Deep Randomness, by using 
their Deep Random Generator (DRG). A DRG is a random generator that produces an output with a 
probability distribution that is made unknown to an external observer. 
  
  is capable to Read all published bit strings from the main channel, Store bit strings, and Make 
computation on bit strings, with unlimited computation and storage power. But when   desires to infer 
a private information generated by  ’s DRG (or by  ’s DRG) from public information, he can only do 
it in respect of the Deep Random assumption    . This assumption creates a ‘virtual’ side channel for 
the observer conditioning the optimal information   he can obtain to estimate the Secret Common 
Output information  . 
This assumption is fully reasonable, as established in the former sections, under the condition that the 
DRG of   and the DRG of   can actually produce distributions that are truly indistinguishable and 
unpredictable among a set   . 
The protocols that we considered in [5] obey the Kerckhoffs’s principle by the fact that their 
specifications are entirely public. We can thus modelize the usage of such protocol in 2 phases: 
 Legitimate partners Opponent 
The elaboration 
phase 
The specification of the protocol is 
made public 
 
(  with notations of section below) 
The observer elaborate its strategy, 
being a deterministic or probabilistic 
function taking as parameters the 
public information that are released 
during an instantiation 
 
(       with notations of section 
below) 
The instantiation 
phase 
The legitimate partners both compute 
their estimation of the Secret Common 
Output information based on (i) their 
part of the secret information 
generated during an instantiation, and 
(ii) the public information that is 
released during the instantiation 
 
(respectively          for   and 
         for   with notations of 
section below) 
The Opponent computes its 
estimation of the Secret Common 
Output information as the value taken 
by its strategy function with the 
released public information as input 
parameters. 
 
(       with notations of section 
below) 
 
 
  
  
 
In this model,   (resp.    requests its Deep Random Generator (DRG) to obtain an experiment   
(resp.  ) of a private random variable with hidden probability distribution   (resp.   );   (resp.    
publishes the set of information   (resp.    on the public channel along the protocol.   calculates the 
Secret Common Output information         , with value in metric space  .   calculates its estimation 
         of the Secret Common Output information, also with value in  . In this model,    is the 
public information available regarding the DRG of   or   (that are supposed to have the same design), 
and    {   } is the set of information published by the partners along the execution of the protocol. 
The DRG of   is run by   completely privately and independently of  , and reversely the DRG of   
is run by   completely privately and independently of  . The 2 DRG are thus not in any way secretly 
correlated, as one of the assumptions of the security model is that   and   share initially no private 
information. 
The eavesdropping opponent   who has a full access to the public information, calculates its own 
estimation      (that we will also shortly denote       ).   is called ‘strategy’ of the opponent. 
As introduced in the ‘Deep Random assumption’ section,    designates the public information 
available about a DRG. We assume here that    is the same for both DRG of   and  , meaning that 
they have the same design. 
From the Deep Random assumption, for any group   in   , the set of optimal strategies for the 
opponent can be restricted to: 
        {      [ | ]|                           } 
Then, the protocol  is an Information Theoretically Secure Protocol (ITSP) if it verifies the following 
property    : 
         |               |      |                                        
It has been shown ([7], [8]) that when a protocol satisfies    |      |    , it can be 
complemented with Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification techniques to reach Unconditional 
Security. 
  
We will also impose a second condition for the definition of an ITSP  . The second condition ensures 
that one can implement a DRG suitable for the protocol   thanks to a recursive and continuous 
generation algorithm that emulates locally the protocol. This approach is presented in section IV and 
introduced below. The second condition is the following: 
     such that for any strategy      { [ | ]|         }, there exists an actual distribution 
         of the variables   and   that verifies   |      |     
     
The condition      means that for any optimal strategy      for the distribution  , there exists a new 
distribution         , such that the condition    |      |     is satisfied (we take    
     to calculate    |   because symmetry in the roles   and   can be assumed when their DRG 
have same design).   does not depend on    because the generation of a distribution by a DRG takes 
place before any instantiation of the protocol. The interest of that condition is that (i) it is not referring 
to the Deep Random Assumption (as it does not involve   ), and therefore (ii) it enables to build a 
Deep Random Generator as follows: at each step    , the generator emulates the ITSP internally 
and picks (through classical randomness) a new couple of identical distributions         
        
             that defeats the optimal strategy (thus belonging to { [ | ]|      
   }) for the past distributions for    . This is always possible for an ITSP as given by condition 
    . We will use this recursive method in the following to design a DRG algorithm. The source of 
secret entropy is the current values of the inifinite counters (several can run in parallel) of the 
continuous recursive process, together with the classical random that is used at each step to pick a 
defeating distribution. Such entropy must of course be at least equal to    | | in order to approach 
perfect secrecy as close as desired. 
 
II. Notations and first considerations 
We will consider in the following a Deep Random generation process that needs to output, when 
requested, a parameter vector in [   ] . 
Let’s now introduce our formalism and define some notations to ease the use of general Bernoulli 
random variables ; considering             and             some parameter vectors in [   ]
  
and             and             some experiment vectors in {   }
 ,       
  two integers, and 
  [   ], we define: 
    (resp.    ) the scalar product of   and   (resp.   and  ) 
| |  ∑   
 
    ; | |  ∑   
 
    
    { |    }  { |    } 
            |           
              |                     
              |                     
  
              |                       
      ∏(                 )
 
   
    |   
that represents probability of obtaining   in a draw of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter 
vector  . 
      ∏(           )
 
   
 
        ∑      
 |     
                      ∑      
 || |  
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)            
that represents the Bernoulli coefficient of parameter  . 
We will also manipulate permutation operators over vectors. For     , we write         
   (      )  {        } and | |               . The permutation of a vector is the 
following linear application : 
           (             ) where   represents the symmetric group 
 
The computations about Bernoulli random variable take place in the vector space of multinomials with 
  variables and local degree 1, noted     , whose {     }  {   }  and {     }  {   }  are basis. It is 
easy to justify that {     }  {   }  is a basis by noting the inversion formula: 
∑         
  {   } 
      ∑     
   
 
To ease the manipulation of upper bounds, we will use the notation      for any quantity with value 
in  and whose absolute value is bounded by . 
If   and   are two entities, owning private parameter vectors    ⁄  and   ⁄  respectively (where   is a 
real number parameter   ), and generating vectors   and   respectively through Bernoulli random 
variables from   ⁄  and   ⁄  respectively, we consider the respective random variables    and    such 
that: 
   
   
 
      
   
 
 
By direct computation: 
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The observer   who has access only to       and who wants to engender a random variable with same 
expected value than    can do no more than estimate it from      . The only possible variable to get a 
strict equality of expectation is: 
 [  |   ]  
    
 
 
  As    takes value in [   ], the engendered variable has necessarily a distribution function shaped 
as : 
 (    |   )           (
 
 
)  (
 
 
) 
Then : 
 [  ]  ∫ ∑  
    {   } 
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)    [  ]  
   
  
 
Considering that {          }    {   }  is a basis for the vectorial space (  
   )
 
 and that : 
∑
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)  
   
  
 
we deduce that ∫            
    
 
 
 
  
On the other hand, we observe that the distance from    to   , called the evaluation gap between   and 
 , by applying Schwarz inequality can be made greater than the variance of    when     
 [(    [  ])
 
]   [(
    
 
  [  ])
 
]  
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)
 
   
)     [     [  ] 
 ] 
which means that if   wants to evaluate     from the public information       with exactly the same 
expectation, it is necessarily less accurate than the legitimate partners. 
However, the observer has no obligation to estimate    with a variable having exactly the same 
expectation than   . As soon as the observer knows the probability distribution that enables   and   to 
independently generate respectively   and  , it can estimate from the public information      , by 
using bayesian inference, a random variable      such that: 
  
 [    [  ] 
 ]   [     [  ] 
 ] 
 [    [  ] 
 ] can be expressed by: 
 [    [  ] 
 ]  ∫ ∑ (     
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where   and    are called the probability distribution of   and  , and {    }    {   }  is called the 
Strategy of the observer. In the above example, the optimal strategy is expressed by: 
      
∫
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|   ] 
that clearly depends on the knowledge of  and  . 
We can obtain easily obtain the following upper-bounds, showing the efficiency of the optimal 
strategy: 
Proposition 0. 
We have :  
(i)      [(       )
 
]   [       
 ]. 
(ii)      [(      [  ])
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  For (i), we write  [       
 ] and simply apply Schwarz inequality : 
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By remarking that 
∫
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 is of the form        the result follows. Let’s denote   
  a strategy 
satisfying      [(       )
 
]. 
For (ii): 
     [(      [  ])
 
]   [   
         [  ] 
 ]     [   
     
 ]   [     [  ] 
 ] 
 
 
  
 
from previous computation.  
  
 
The strategy of the observer is obtained by quadratic optimization (conditional expectation), we 
simply observe by Schwarz inequality that a strategy is actually a deterministic function of the public 
information, taking values within the same sample space than the evaluated random variable. This 
justifies the notation      [    ⁄ ]. 
In all what follows, the observer strategy will then always be a deterministic function of the public 
information. 
 
When Bernoulli random variables are considered through quadratic evaluation, the probability 
distribution  of a legitimate partner can be considered through its quadratic matrix: 
        ∫           
 
[   ] 
 
   is a symmetric matrix with elements in [   ]. 
  is assumed even. The notation    represents the set of all subsets   of {     } containing   ⁄  
elements. We remind that for     , the notation   ̅designates {     }   thus also in   . Let’s first 
introduce the canonical mid-segment: 
   {    
 
 ⁄ } 
and the canonical mid-segment permutation    that sends    in   ̅ and vice versa: 
         (    
 
 ⁄ ) 
With this, we now introduce the « tidied form » of a probability distribution . For any  , there exists 
a (not necessarily unique) pair of permutations    
    
   in    such that: 
      ∑            
         ̅
    
    
(
 
  
∑          
         ̅
) 
      ∑            
         ̅
    
    
(
 
  
∑          
         ̅
) 
We remark that composing   by    does not change a pair    
    
   due to the symmetry of   . 
Actually, we will call    a tidying permutation of   as being either (with 50% chance) a   
  or a 
  
 . In other words, if we designate by    the sub-group    {    |           }, then we 
mean that picking a tidying permutation of   is equivalent to choose a permutation uniformly within 
{  
      
         
      
      |        } (obviously this set does not depend on 
which possible pair    
    
   is chosen). 
We then call a tidied form of  , denoted by     , a distribution obtained by composing   with any 
possible tidying permutation picked randomly. In other words, a tidied form of a distribution is a 
distribution of the form: 
  
 ̃    
 
 
(                 ) (               )
 
|   |
∑       
  
     
     
Then we define the following probability distribution set: 
     { ||           |  √ } 
 
III. Deep Random generation for Bernoulli experiment vectors 
In the present Section, we discuss methods to generate Deep Random from a computing source. It may 
appear difficult to generate Deep Random from a deterministic computable program. In the real world, 
even if a computer may access sources of randomness whose probability distribution is at least partly 
unknown, it doesn’t mean that we can use it to build reliable Deep Randomness for cryptographic 
applications. A specialized strategy is needed. 
Generation process and strategies 
We present a theoretically valid method to generate Deep Random from a computing source. That 
method relies on a recursive and continuously executing algorithm that generates at each step a new 
probability distribution, based on a Cantor’ style diagonal constructing process. 
Taking back the notations of Section II, we will denote for more simplicity: 
〈   〉   [(     
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where both   and   are generated with the same probability distribution . 
Proposition 1. 
Let  be distribution in     , then there exists a constant   such that: 
(i) For any strategy  , 
 
  
∑ 〈     〉  
 
     
 
(ii) For any strategy  , there exists       such that 〈      〉  
 
 
 
  
(i) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3 of [5], that provides the last inequality below: 
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the first inequality being obtained by using Schwarz inequality. And (ii) is an immediate consequence 
of (i) as the average summing is lesser than the maximum element. 
  
 
  
Let’s present a heuristic argument. With a recursive algorithm privately and continuously executed by 
a partner, the steps   and     are indistinguishable for the observer  . If a set    of winning 
strategies at the moment of step   exists for  , then for any probability distribution  , by using 
Schwarz inequality: 
 
|  |
∑ 〈   〉
    
 〈
 
|  |
∑  
    
  〉 
and thus, by choosing at step    the probability distribution     such that: 
〈
 
|  |
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     〉  
 
 
   (     [       
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)) 
(which is always possible as stated by Proposition 1) the partner guarantees that no absolute winning 
strategy exists, because the current step at the moment of observation cannot be determined by 
observer as rather being  or   . 
This heuristic argument does not explain how to practically build a Deep Random generator with 
classical computing resources, but it introduces the diagonal constructing process inspired from non-
collaborative games’ theory. Of course, no Nash’ style equilibrium can be found as the partner is 
continuously deviating its distribution strategy to avoid forecast from observer. 
Another interesting remark at this stage is that, in Proposition 1, we highlighted low entropy subsets of 
probability distributions (typically {   |     }) in which a distribution can always be found to 
fool a given strategy  . Such subsets have entropy of order         although the whole set of 
possible probability distributions has an entropy of order      , which is not manageable by classical 
computing resources. 
Let’s now express a recursive algorithm, inspired from the above heuristic argument. 
Let’s first consider the two following recursive algorithms: 
Algorithm 1: 
   is a distribution in      ; at step  : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈    〉 
ii)      is chosen in       
iii)      in chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
 
 
 which is always possible as per 
Proposition 1 
iv)                
Algorithm 2: 
   is a distribution in      ; at step  : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈  
 
 
∑   
 
   〉 
ii)      is chosen in       
  
iii)      in chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
 
 
 which is always possible as per 
Proposition 1 
iv)                
The algorithm 1 involves fast variations, but, if the choices of      and      are deterministic at 
each step , it can have short period (typically period of 2), which makes it unsecure. The algorithm 2 
has no period but its variations are slowing down when   is increasing. We can justify that the 
algorithm 2 has no period by seeing that, if it would have a period, then 
 
 
∑   
 
    would converge, 
which would contradict the fact that 〈 ̂      〉  
 
 
. 
Thus, by combining the two algorithms, we get a sequence with both fast variations and no periodic 
behavior. A method to combine both algorithms is the following: 
The Recursive Generation algorithm: 
   is a distribution in      ; at step  : 
i)  ̂  is performing a minimum value of    〈    〉 
ii)  ̂   is performing a minimum value of    〈  
 
 
∑   
 
   〉 
iii)      and      are chosen randomly in       
iv)      is chosen such that 〈 ̂           〉  
 
 
 which is always possible as per 
Proposition 1 
v)       is chosen such that 〈 ̂              〉  
 
 
 which is always possible as per 
Proposition 1 
vi)                                        where      [   ] can be 
picked randomly 
Such an algorithm is secure « against the past », even if the choices at each step are deterministic, but 
it is not secure « against the future » if the choices at each step are deterministic. Being secure 
« against the future » means that if the observer runs the recursive algorithm on its own and is « in 
advance » compared to the legitimate partner, it still cannot obtain knowledge about the current value 
of   . So, for the algorithm to remain secure also against the future, it is necessary that the choices at 
each step involve classical randomness with maximum possible entropy among     . 
It is also important that the DRG is capable to pick at each step a new distribution within the widest 
possible sub-set of     , otherwise, any restriction in such possible ‘picking set’ would add prior 
information for the opponent about the possible distribution, and would therefore reduce        . 
To that regards, it can be noted that, in the above algorithm, the distribution      (resp.      ) can 
actually be chosen tidied in    (e.g.                        ) because anyway it is further 
recomposed by a permutation      (resp.      ). From there, we also remark that one can reduce the 
entropy of choosing a new distribution tidied in    by observing that, for any such distribution   and 
for any            ̅, a partner has no reason to choose   rather than      , and therefore any 
such distribution can be considered of the form: 
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it is clear with a bit of attention that: 
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and thus      is isomorph to a subset of the 2 dimensional set: 
{     ⁄  [   ] | ∑       
       ⁄
  } 
The exact subset is conditioned by the constraint      . Let’s express this exact subset. By Lemma 
1, we know that, for       
∫ (
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Now, if  also belongs to      we can directly calculate the left term and obtain: 
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Finally, we obtain the simpler expression of      that clearly represents      a 2-dimensional set 
with reduced entropy of      : 
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Choosing the weights of         can be implemented by using a congruential generator in order to 
avoid storing the full [   ]   ⁄  
 
 structure, but it is then recommended that the entropy of the seed of 
  
the generator is at least of the size of the entropy of what is published about each new (used) 
distribution , e.g.   {    }           . 
 
Argument about the minimum number of steps to reach the maturity period of the Recursive 
Generation Process 
We consider a convex and compact subset   of possible strategies for the observer (for any subset, its 
closed convex envelop corresponds to that characteristic). We consider in the followings the sequence 
of probability distributions {  }     constructed as follows : 
     
where   is a sleeked distribution in     , called the seed of the sequence ;  ̂  is performing a 
minimum value in : 
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     is chosen such that : 
〈 ̂      〉  
 
 
 
Diagonal Sequence Property. 
There exists two constants    and     such that, for any   verifying  
 
     
         , 
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More precisely, we chose     as: 
     
 
 
                                                                
where    is a permutation such that 〈 ̂      〉  
 
 
. 
Let’s set: 
 ̂     ̂   
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 ̂  and    are positive quadratic forms over     derived by respective distributions 
 
 
∑           
 
    and           .         ensures that  ̂  and    are non-degenerate in  . 
By considering a basis that is simultaneously  ̂ -orthonormal and   -orthogonal, we obtain the 2 
following relations (remind that  ̂  is the minimum over the quadratic form  ̂ ): 
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We have then: 
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Applying the 2 above relations to        , we get: 
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where the last inequality is obtained by taking the minimum of 
 
   
   
 √      
   
  over  . 
Let’s consider the recurring sequence: 
              
 
  
 
      
 
 
    ̂  
By recurring argument,  ̂     and thus : 
 ̂  
 
  
        (
     
 
) 
which achieves the proof.  
If we consider first   as the full set of strategies (e.g. [  
 
 
]
   
), the dimension is     and thus the 
constructing algorithm must be iterated exponential times to reach positive lower bound. On the other 
hand, we make the excessive assumption that the observer has a full knowledge of the distributions 
chosen by the partner at each step   (of the sequences {  }   ) to be able to build optimal  ̂ . In 
practice, the observer has never more knowledge about a distribution than a draw of   degraded vector 
 , which means that we can restrict the set of strategies to a subset     with dimension     , and thus 
  
the recommended number of iterations for a recursive constructing process before being able to 
trustfully pick a distribution is          . 
With the same reasoning than the one of Diagonal Sequence Property, we can obtain a more general 
result: 
 
Generalized Diagonal Sequence Property. 
There exists two constants       and        such that, for any   verifying  
 
     
         , 
and for any {       }       and {         }      , and any permutation    
synchronizing   and    : 
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This result also means that when {       } and {         } are generated by DRGs, if an 
observer choose the same strategy   at each step  , then whatever is that strategy, in average we have 
〈           〉      [       
 ] as soon as  
 
     
         , and the observer therefore loose 
its capacity to estimate    as efficiently as  . In other words the distributions become unknown for the 
observer as soon as  
 
     
         , otherwise the observer would be able estimate    as 
efficiently as   by Bayesian inference. 
 
Algorithmic implementation 
In order to be able to execute the recursive process described in the previous sections, it is necessary to 
be able to implement en efficient computing routine to determine, given 2 distributions    and   , a 
permutation      such that ( ̂  being the strategy performing a minimum value of    〈    〉): 
〈 ̂         〉  
 
 
 
It is the main objective of this technical article to present a workable algorithm to do so. It is generally 
not an easy problem to determine      because, while the optimal strategy       [  |   ] can easily 
be expressed mathematically, it cannot be practically computed. We will propose 2 algorithmic 
methods. 
 
First algorithmic method: the bilinear approximation 
The first proposed algorithm relies on a bilinear approximation of the observer strategy. General 
strategies      are members of the set [   ]
   . We consider the bilinear approximation strategies of 
the form: 
              
  
where   is a matrix in     . With formerly defined notation, and by also denoting, 
   ∫         
 
[   ] 
 
one can then write the expression of  [     [  ] 
 ] by direct computation: 
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The above expression can be seen as a bilinear form over the vector space     , whose matrix can 
be written: 
   ((       
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and its quadratic equation being: 
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Proposition 2: 
There exists a constant      such that: 
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and       . 
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By considering    as a block matrix, we easily determine its inverse: 
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The minimization of      thanks to   
   is well known, and we can then compute the value of the 
minimum  depending on    and ̃ : 
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Let’s set: 
    
 
 
     
 
 
  
  enables to write: 
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  is symmetric positive (and even positive-definite if  is not a Dirac distribution), because: 
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Therefore all eigenvalues are positive and we can write the diagonalization of   with unitary matrix   
(we denote  ̃ the diagonal reduction of  ): 
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By replacing ̃  by  
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in all the terms under the trace operator in the right hand term of       , and by reminding that the 
elements of the unitary matrix   obey: 
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we can manage to obtain the following bounds: 
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And thus eventually we get: 
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We will denote in the following    the bilinear form that realizes            [     [  ] 
 ], and 
    the associated bilinear strategy. 
The bilinear approximation    is much easier to manipulate as its size is    
   instead of       . In 
particular, it is much easier to determine      with      than with  ̂ . We will admit without proof 
that: 
     |     
          〈      
      〉    〈 ̂   
      〉                            
This conjecture is certainly not easy to prove in the general case, but it is verified in simulations. The 
proposition 2 gives an indication that the approximation is efficient as it gives the same order of 
magnitude  (
 
  
) than for the optimal strategy  ̂ . 
Then, determining      such that 〈      
      〉    is equivalent to determine      verifying: 
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The above can be computed by exploring: 
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Those explorations can be performed by finding recursively a transposition that decreases (resp 
increases) the above expression. Such method does not guarantee to find the optimum, but it enables to 
exceed a bound   with a good probability of success; it follows preparatory sums that are of 
complexity      ; the search of a decreasing (resp. increasing) permutation is then of complexity 
     , and one can show that the number of steps before it stops decreasing (resp. increasing) is 
    . Before starting such exploration, it is of course needed to determine the matrix     and    , 
whose main cost is the computation of ̃  
  
. This inverse can be obtained by the recursive method 
           (     ̃  ) 
for   chosen strictly inferior to the spectral radius of ̃  . By noting that 
̃
   is a positive matrix, the 
algorithm converges with exponential speed. Its complexity, by using Strassen algorithm for each 
  
matrix product, is             to obtain a residual error in     ⁄  . Thus, the overall complexity of 
the exploration process is      . 
 
Second algorithmic method: the partition summing 
This method is based on the restriction of the form of the optimal strategy obtained by considering the 
symmetries within the generator. 
For     {   } , we denote      is the sub-group of    that let stable    ,    ,̅  ̅    and  ̅   :̅ 
     {    | {   }      {         }     }. We remind that the notation   ̅ designates the 
complement of   in {   } , and the notation | | designates the cardinality of  . If   is a hidden 
distribution generated by  ’s Deep Random Generator, and if the observer only knows   , the assumed 
value of a synchronization permutation    of  and   issued from a Bernoulli trial of parameter vector 
  generated by , all happen for the observer as if   would perform the sequence below: 
        
           
→          
 
   
At the first step     is generated by a certain distribution      (synchronized on   ), at second step 
            corresponds to a mixing simultaneously within     
     ,          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,   ̅   
     , 
and   ̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and at third step,   produces the final  . The resulting distribution to be considered is 
denoted: 
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In the following,  |  designates the restriction of the vector   to its components having their index 
within  . 
It has been shown in [5] (Proposition 9) the following result: 
Proposition 3. 
  represents any permutation independent of    . We have the following restricted form for the 
optimal strategy: 
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In the recursive generation process, at step , the optimal strategy can therefore be approximated by: 
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It becomes then easier to search a sub-set   with | |    ⁄ , such that, for a given new distribution 
       tidied in   (e.g.   
        ), we obtain: 
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The distribution  ̃    has a quadratic matrix of the form: 
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can be computed as a function of   ,   ,   , and         , which enables to find easily a value of 
         maximizing 〈 ̂   ̃      
  〉 with error      ⁄  . The details of the computation are not 
developed here because of they are painful without presenting any conceptual difficulty. The 
complexity of this search is      once   ,   ,    are computed. The computation of   ,   ,    has 
a complexity of      . Thus, the overall complexity of the exploration process is      , which makes 
the second method more efficient than the first one. 
The computation of   ,   ,    involves a step of tidying for the quadratic matrix  . We give below 
an efficient tidying algorithm: 
Tidying Algorithm 
Step 1: compute for   {     }, the value    ∑             ∑            ̅  
Step 2: order {  } so that            ̅, then      . An obvious way of doing this to 
compute the sorting permutation                
Step 3: then   is a tidying permutation of . 
Here is a proof: 
Proposition 4. 
The tidying algorithm above ensures that ∑                       ̅  is minimal 
  
  First, due to the fact that       is a norm (see Proposition 5 below), we can always modify the 
matrix   by infinitesimal perturbation to ensure that all the values of 
{ ∑              
         ̅
|     } 
are distinct. This ensures that the segment      realizing       ∑               ̅  is unique. 
We remark that, for          ̅, the transposition   permuting   and   has the following property: 
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       (                        ) 
We have first 
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[   ] 
   
Therefore, let’s suppose that ∑               ̅  is already minimal, then if its vector {  } is not 
ordered, then there would exist          ̅ such that      , and thus: 
∑ (                     )
         ̅
   
which would contradict minimality. This means that the vector is necessarily ordered. By unicity, we 
then deduce reversely that if the vector is ordered, then ∑               ̅  is minimal.  
The complexity of step 1 is      , the step 2 is a classical sorting procedure whose complexity is 
        . Then the overall complexity does not exceeed       as claimed. 
  
Proposition 5. 
      is a norm on the subspace of the matrix without their main diagonal, for any    .  
  Let’s justify by showing that                       : 
  is obvious. 
For , we calculate 
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We conclude by noticing that: 
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IV. Conclusion 
We have given in this article a polynomial time algorithm that can be recursively executed to form a 
Deep Random generator within a classical computing resource. Such Deep Random generator is the 
core component of Deep Random secrecy introduced in [5]. It is the first of several articles aiming at 
proposing a practical implementation of Deep Random Secrecy. Besides Deep Random Secrecy, Deep 
Random generators may have other applications in contexts where it is desired to prevent third parties 
to make efficient predictions over a probabilistic model; one could think about preventing speculative 
trading for instance. 
Further work on the ideas and methods introduced in this article could typically cover theoretical 
aspects, like finding a rigorously proven method to generate      (proving the conjecture      , or 
proving that the general problem can always be lower-bounded by using a partition summing method, 
are two ways of doing so). It could also cover practical aspects like finding the fastest possible 
algorithm to compute an acceptable     . 
Further work on Deep Random generation in general could typically pursue a more general 
characterization of what Deep Random generators could be, then triggering research for optimal 
implementation for each category of them. Within the category of recursive generators running on 
classical computing resources, a set of general and rigorously defined characteristics that they should 
verify would be welcome, in order to organize the research on this topic. Such characteristics should 
typically cover the Deep Random assumption introduced in [5], and its application to secrecy systems. 
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Annex 1: An impossibility result 
One could be tempted to try to reduce the entropy of the set of distributions coursed by a DRG to a 
polynomial dimension set. We show here a result stating that it is or impossible or unsecure. 
Let’s first define what we mean by reducing entropy. We consider   a subset of distributions of     . 
We define the associated set of optimal strategies      by: 
     { [
   
  
|   ]
  
|   } 
Then we say that   is called  -stable iff: 
               〈   〉  
 
 
 
One can understand this definition as the possibility for a DRG to execute the recursive algorithm 
described above by keeping the picking of each new distribution   within  . 
We have the following result (with the same notations than for the Diagonal Sequence Property): 
Theorem A1: 
Any subset   of      that is both    -stable and convex has a superpolynomial dimension 
  By contradiction. Let’s assume that the dimension of   can be bounded by   . As a consequence of 
the Diagonal Sequence Property, we can extract from   a sequence {  } such that, for any   verifying  
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We denote by ̃  the distribution ̃  
 
 
∑       .  
̃
  is still in   because   is convex, and        
means that when     are results of draws from both the distribution  ̃ , we can find a polynomial 
     such that, for any strategy  , by extracting the square terms in the sum  ̃     ̃    , we can 
write (for √         : 
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On the other hand, we know that there exist a constant   such that (Chernoff style bound; see for 
instance [5] Proposition 3) 
 (|   
   
  
|  
 
√  
)                                                                 
 (|   
   
  
|  
 
√  
)       
 (|     |  
 
√  
)       
  
Let’s now consider the restricted condition          , available to the partner   in the emulated 
protocol: 
             |              |  
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For any strategy  , from        and        we deduce that one can find have a polynomial      such 
that 
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On the other hand, let’s consider      the optimal strategy realizing: 
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  can be written: 
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It is a continuous because, due to       , the measure of           is lower bounded by a strictly 
positive constant independent of  , and therefore 
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)  ̃      ̃        
 
  
         
   
  being both bounded and continuous, has a fix point    (Brouwer). Then, if we consider the 
conditional distribution resulting from the discard of all instances not verifying           , it still is a 
known distribution and therefore, by considering the emulated protocol, we have 
       |       
and then Shannon impossibility theorem dictates that the optimal strategy    verifies the first 
inequality below; and further more        also applies to    which gives the second inequality below 
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This contradicts the fact that, by definition of            
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(the quantity     is super-polynomial for appropriate choice of   and thus          can be made as 
small as desired, and in particular (
  
 
  
 
  
  
))  
This result means that it is impossible to find a convex subset of      of polynomial dimension, where 
the DRG will be able to always pick a successor in the recursive algorithm. 
  
On the other hand, the subset that we have obtained in the description of the algorithm is not 
constrained by the pessimistic result of Theorem A1, because, while being of polynomial dimension, it 
is not convex. Indeed, this set is 
{   |           } 
and it is easy to see that while      alone is convex, the composition by    remove the convexity. 
